Future directions for a critical social psychology of racism/antiracism by Howarth, Caroline & Hook, Derek
  
Caroline Howarth and Derek Hook 
Future directions for a critical social 
psychology of racism/antiracism 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
Original citation: 
Howarth, Caroline and Hook, Derek (2005) Future directions for a critical social psychology of 




© 2005 Wiley 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/2804/
 
Available in LSE Research Online: May 2011 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final manuscript accepted version of the journal article, 
incorporating any revisions agreed during the peer review process.  Some differences between 
this version and the published version may remain.  You are advised to consult the publisher’s 
version if you wish to cite from it. 
Future directions for a critical social psychology of racism/antiracism 
Derek Hook & Caroline Howarth 
 
In devising the call for papers for this special issue (and for the two symposia which 
formed part of its preparatory work1) we had deliberately framed our objectives with the 
proposition „towards a critical social psychology of racism‟ – an indication that such a 
version of critical psychology had yet to be attained. Despite the important contributions 
we have assembled here, and the many useful conversations we‟ve shared with 
colleagues since beginning this project, the goal of attaining a definitive critical social 
psychology of racism remains elusive. There are many reasons for this, some of which 
stem from a disciplinary history of social psychology that has at times viewed overtly 
political discourse - much like issues of cultural-historical contextualization - as 
anathema to good science. Another reason that might be cited here is the often 
impoverished notion of „social‟ that qualifies social psychology: a „social‟ which all too 
often may be collapsed into the analytical frame of individualizing psychological 
humanism (Farr, 1996; Moscovici, 1972).  
 Aside from these considerations, there is another reason why a definitive critical 
social psychology of racism and antiracism cannot, and should not, be „finally‟ reached. 
An obvious consideration in this respect is the multiple permutations of historical forms 
of racism that require the ongoing generation of new analytical frames, new modes of 
intervention that will not simply be completed, „finalised‟. Another consideration is that a 
critical social psychology of racism and antiracism is best served by a field of multiple 
types of analysis, enquiry, debate and involvement (Riggs and Augoustinos, this issue). 
To speak of having attained a definitive critical social psychology of racism seems, to 
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 The first of these was held in Cape Town on the 20
th
 June at the International Society for 
Theoretical Psychology Conference, the second in Durban on 29
th
 June at Beyond the Pale 
International Critical Psychology Conference.  
 
us, to point to a homogenization of methodological and theoretical perspectives that is 
the exact opposite of our goals here. The last thing that a critical social psychology of 
racism should aim at is the entrenchment of an orthodoxy of methods, perspectives, 
approaches: for a social formation as multifaceted and historically-variable as racism, 
we benefit from as much conceptual, political and analytical richness as we are able to 
provoke.  
 A critical social psychology of racism and antiracism then will never be 
complete, just as it will never be wholly singular, or cohesive, at least not in the sense 
of being impervious to argumentation and debate. It is in this spirit, of camaraderie, 
debate, innovation and collaboration that we wish to offer some reflections on future 
possible directions for a critical social psychology of racism and antiracism that we 
hope will never attain a definitive or singular status. 
 
Different modes of writing: opposing ‘regimes of whiteness’  
It is by no means incidental that at the beginning of their paper Kirkwood, Liu & 
Weatherall make reference to a work of fiction, namely Toni Morrison‟s (1999) 
Paradise. Our point here is not so much to emphasize the illustrative role of fiction - 
which we can agree is often exemplary - but to consider the political utility of making 
reference to a different epistemological domain to that of the social sciences. Clearly 
different „rules of truth‟ apply in the world of fiction to those which structure and 
condition what we can say and/or write in the institutionalised settings of social 
scientific discourse. Different things can be said, different statements, positionings, 
imaginings, modes of self-reflection can be managed here than might be 
accommodated within the stricter truth-conditions of, say, mainstream disciplinary 
social psychology.  
This in itself may strike us as a less than striking formulation; the pertinence of 
such a distinction is best grasped in view of the pervasiveness of particular formations 
of „whiteness‟, „whiteness‟ that is not only as an insidious category of psychic 
investment through which particular histories of privilege are consolidated (as 
documented in this special issue), but also as an epistemic principle, that is, as subtle 
(and sometimes less than subtle) precondition of knowledge, belonging, authority, 
rationality, moral rightness, and so on. Here we are pointing to the role of whiteness as 
an ordering principle of knowledge, or, perhaps more directly yet to the multiple veils of 
white racism which conditions and structures the truth-value of subjectivity.  
We might put this in a different way, by pointing to the pervasiveness of those 
knowledge-systems, institutional structures, concentrations of wealth, and modes of 
self-reflection that maintain strong historical ties to an imperial and colonial past. We 
have in mind here Kopano Ratele‟s (2005) discussion – which itself draws on Toni 
Morrison - of the problems of „speaking one‟s self‟ as a black subject in a post-
apartheid setting without making reference to those words, themes and concepts that 
locate one as a subject who is always secondary to a given racial designation. This is a 
problem that Achille Mbembe (2002) takes up in the prioritization he places on what he 
terms „African modes of self-writing‟, that is, the making possible of certain relations to 
history, narration and authority which are able to acknowledge the harsh facticity of 
colonial racism and yet to do so in a way which does not lock such African authors into 
a secondary relation to Western (or white) structures of meanings and identity. This is 
also a theme of Fanon‟s, and is perhaps the element that makes sections of Black Skin 
White Masks (1952) so difficult: the fact that in avoiding the assimilation of the master 
discourse of white culture he needs to fashion a new hybrid language of critique, one 
which emerges as an often unsettling mix of personal reminiscences, autobiographical 
anecdotes, philosophical and literary reflections. It is often neglected, in fact, the 
degree to which sections of Black Skin White Mask are based on literary forms of 
analysis, on the discussion of fictional treatments of colonial themes. 
 The point to be made here is simply this: if the social sciences disciplines from 
which we speak are themselves subject to regimes of knowledge which serve 
„whiteness‟ – a case that is made, in a slightly different manner, in much of Edward 
Said‟s work, notably so in the case of Orientalism (1978) – then it becomes important 
to investigate different modes of writing, different modes of self-reflection than those 
regularized by the disciplinary social science history that we so often find ourselves 
subject to. This, clearly, is not to forego traditional social psychological investigation, or 
social scientific scholarship more generally. It is though to point to the limits of our 
ideological imagination within such domains, and to ask ourselves what can be 
imagined and said outside of such frames of intelligibility, and what the analytics of a 
critical social psychology of racism and antiracism might learn from them. 2 
 
Resistance psychology, phenomenological analysis and the everyday  
Such terms of outside reference (the domains of fiction and popular culture) are able to 
put us into a different relation to moments of everyday experience than can be 
expected from many current social psychological methods; here we resonate with 
Durrheim and Dixon‟s complaints about the lack of a suitable critical register for 
accommodating just such terms of everyday experience. Clearly we are not 
recommending exclusive reference to the domain of fiction here; in so far as the project 
is that of capturing the terms of everyday experience – which, contrary to what is 
asserted by many discourse theorists, is not simply superceded by governing 
structures of discourse – we might refer to a range of historical documents of everyday 
life (see Highmore, 2002), to autobiography as method, or to a variety of community 
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 Paul Gilroy‟s (2000) extended reflections on the works of Ralph Ellison and Richard Wright 
make for an interesting case in point here, as does Homi Bhabha‟s (1994) extended 
engagement with Toni Morrison and Salman Rushdie; in both cases fictional works are as 
important to the work of conceptualizing resistance as are more overtly scholarly or analytical 
texts.  
 
psychological methods such as „photo-voice‟ (see Lykes, TerreBlanche & Hamber 
(2003) which aim to capture such moments, images and narratives. Here it is also 
worth consulting Hayes (2004), who asserts the importance of a „critical psychology of 
everyday life‟ and offers a biting critique of how psychology typically produces a view of 
an abstract individual cut off from the concrete materiality of everyday life.  
This is not simply an argument about an impossibly abstracted (and, not 
incidentally, an insidiously raced) version of subjectivity that then comes to be 
generalized in much social psychological thinking. It is an argument about how the 
world of everyday experience opens up moments of contradiction, juxtaposition and 
reformulation. Consider for example Said‟s (1993) notion of contrapuntal experience 
along with Du Bois‟ (1989) notion of double consciousness; these are moments of 
reflection and critique which emerge from the ordinary contexts of everyday 
experience. Here one might also make mention of the Black Consciousness 
Movement, one aspect of which was the attempt to connect the smallest and most 
„apolitical‟ facet of daily experience to larger facts of oppression, solidarity and 
opposition (Biko, 1978). Such moments of everyday reformulation and critique, we 
would argue, are one means of complimenting and developing the argumentative 
resources advanced by both Green & Sonn and by Kirkwood, Liu & Weatherall as 
crucial aspects of an antiracist agenda.  
Another example of such a „resistance psychology‟ is worth noting here: 
Chabanyi Manganyi‟s (1973) often autobiographical anti-apartheid text: Being-black-in-
the-world. This text shares with Fanon‟s Black Skin White Masks a commitment to a 
phenomenological mode of analysis, which, to be certain, does not necessarily consign 
one to a depoliticized, perceptual, psycho- existential frame, as seems often to be 
assumed by proponents of social constructionist/discursive approaches (Painter, 
2005). Moreover, such a perspective is also one that pushes the powerfully embodied 
nature of “race” and racism – a critical imperative, as emphasized by Riggs & 
Augoustinos (this issue) - to the very forefront of analytical scrutiny. Here one only 
needs recall Fanon‟s (1952) pained and frequently lyrical, indeed, poetic attempts to 
illustrate the more visceral devices of racism in a materialist language of corporeal 
experience. 3  This gives us cause to reflect on whether Social Psychology often seems 
stuck in the perspective of its current methodological preferences. Despite the obvious 
pertinence of Durrheim and Dixon‟s commentary on the limitations of current social 
psychological instruments – which are certainly pertinent - we would suggest that the 
history of the discipline does offer one prospective set of tools – a politically applied 
form of phenomenological analysis, perhaps in the model supplied by Manganyi (1973) 
- that may well be up to the task of capturing the embodied, spatio-temporal practices 
of everyday lived experiences. 
 
Subjects before subjectivity 
The body itself of course, along with questions of the psychology of embodiment – and 
questions of embodied racialized experience – deserves far greater attention within 
critical psychological perspectives on racism, as Riggs & Augoustinos make clear in 
their paper, particularly in their emphasis on epidermalization. Here then another 
Fanonian problematic, usefully extended and discussed by Gilroy (2000): the 
heightened bodily sense of „the getting under the skin‟ of racial bodily markers which 
succeed in „overdetermining‟ the subject „from without‟. This sense of how bodily 
attributes come to exert a determining influence on how identity is assembled within 
specific socio-historical co-ordinates is particularly pertinent: it disrupts the ascendancy 
of a particular psychologistic mode of explanation that presumes an individual subject 
existing prior to the constitutive force of social, material, bodily factors.   
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 For a recent existentialist-phenomenological account that involves an incisive component of 
bodily analysis, see Gordon (1997). For a more psychoanalytic treatment of the same themes, 
see Clarke (2002). 
In Fanon‟s dedication to these factors – each of which we would argue is worth 
more sustained attention in an antiracist critical social psychology - we have three 
instances (the social, the bodily, materiality) in which psychology cannot be said to pre-
empt factors of subjectification. Riggs & Augoustinos make just such an argument in 
their paper, pointing to a series of formative conditions – principally the subject‟s 
placement in a cultural, historical and political order which precedes them – formative 
conditions which underlie and substantiate certain lines of privilege and ways of 
knowing, and from which „whiteness‟ is all too quick to disassociate itself. 
Individualizing psychological humanism by contrast would attempt to understand the 
person not as subject to these forces of constitution, but rather as able to transcend 
them. Here we need to refer back to the fabrication of the interior/exterior distinction 
that Butler (1997) speaks of, and indeed, the importance of grasping the psychic 
internalisation of norms reiterated by Riggs & Augoustinos, to comprehend the 
quickness of the white subject‟s disavowal of the racism that is so constitutive of the 
discursive category „whiteness‟. (In this instance, so long as „whiteness‟ is never 
divorced from the structural racist relations that have conditioned its emergence, 
whiteness studies does pose itself as a viable ally for a critical social psychology of 
racism).  
If it is the case that subjectification precedes psychological subjectivity – and 
the most rudimentary themes of Marxist and poststructuralist analysis suggest it is -  
then we cannot presume an autonomous psychological individual above and beyond 
social/material forces which constitute their subject-hood. For this reason critical social 
psychological forms of analysis need to be more multi-disciplinary, more multi-
perspectival than has traditionally been the case. Whereas historically, social 
psychology has been quite willing to align itself with scientific and quantitative 
methodological means, it has been far more tentative in its willingness to align itself 
with current developments in social/cultural theory, the humanities, or literary studies 
(the almost complete absence of postcolonial criticism within contemporary social 
psychology is a case in point).  This, we would argue, is not a viable route forward for a 
critical social psychology of racism/antiracism, which can only benefit from the 
exploration of those points of overlap shared by social psychology, critical social 
studies, social history and so on. Here it is worth pointing out that a critical social 
psychology of racism requires, as its necessary corollary, a social psychology of 
multiculturalism (as intimated in the introduction to this issue). Some of the most 
interesting examples of work in this area – Said‟s (2003) thoughts on cosmopolitanism, 
Gilroy‟s writing on multiculturalism after empire (2004) and planetary humanism (2000), 
even Hardt & Negri‟s (2005) recent musings on mass resistance to contemporary 
conditions of empire, Multitude – clearly stem from outside the disciplinary domain of 
psychology. 
The argument for inter-disciplinary collaboration can be made even more 
strongly: if an adequate critical engagement with racism requires a far more committed 
engagement with the forces of subjectification as mentioned above (those means of 
subjectification that predate the psychological subject) then we must look outside of 
standard psychological modes of analysis; to not do so would be to fail to apprehend 
what Butler refers to as the „psychic life of power‟.     
 
Conclusion 
Several points might be made here then, in response both to under-utilized avenues for 
critical social psychology and in respect of how it may more effectively link produce a 
form of resistance psychology. The first is simply to assert that as critical social 
psychologists we should feel less trepidation at the possibility of reference to the 
realms of fiction, biography, popular culture and everyday experience than commonly 
seems the case. Some of the most vital currents in contemporary cultural studies – the 
analytical usefulness in particular of notions such as performativity, hybridity and 
mimicry, habitus and field (for a succinct overview of related concepts see McRobbie, 
2005) - appear to have gone almost totally under-utilized in social psychology, a 
discipline which all too often appears to prefer disciplinary isolation to the prospects of 
collaboration with cultural and social theorists, or to vital terms of reference provided by 
literary or aesthetic domains (the work of Brown (2001), is a welcome exception to this 
rule). One might be forgiven for assuming that the cultural turn – clearly such a fulcrum 
of critique in the work of luminaries such as Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy – had passed 
social psychology by completely, and with it – disturbingly – a series of possibilities for 
resistance. The prospect of such collaborations between social psychological and 
social/cultural theoretical perspectives affords us the opportunity to grasp something of 
the interplay between subjectification and psychological subjectivity; this is something 
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